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ABSTRACT: The Space Shuttle is an advanced manned launch system with a respectable history of service 
and a demonstrated level of safety. Recent studies have shown that the Space Shuttle has a relatively low 
probability of having a failure that is instantaneously catastrophic during nominal flight as compared with 
mflny TTS finn intemat.;onallallnch flystemfl . However, since the Space Shuttle is a manned. system, a number 
of mission abort contingencies exist to primarily ensure the safety of the crew during off-nominal situations 
and to attempt to maintain the integrity of the Orbiter. 
As the Space Shuttle ascends to orbit it transverses various intact abort regions evaluated and planned before 
the flight to ensure that the Space Shuttle Orbiter, along with its crew, may be returned intact either to the 
original launch site, a transoceanic landing site, or returned from a substandard orbit. An intact abort may be 
initiated due to a number of system failures but the highest likelihood and most challenging abort scenarios 
are initiated by a premature shutdown of a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The potential consequences 
of such a shutdown vary as a function of a number of mission parameters but all of them may be related to 
mission time for a specific mission profile. 
This paper focuses on the Dynamic Abort Risk Evaluation (DARE) model process, applications, and its capa-
bility to evaluate the risk of Loss Of Vehicle (LOV) due to the complex systems interactions that occur during 
Space Shuttle intact abort scenarios. In addition, the paper will examine which of the Space Shuttle subsys-
tems are critical to ensuring a successful return of the Space Shuttle Orbiter and crew from such a situation. 
1 
2 
3 INTRODUCTION 
The Dynamic Abort Risk Evaluation (DARE) model 
is a dynamic risk assessment model that evaluates 
the risk of intact Space Shuttle abort scenarios, 
namely, Return To Launch Site (RTLS), Trans-
Atlantic Landing (TAL) and Abort To Orbit (ATO). 
The DARE model was developed by Science Ap-
plications International Corporation (SAlC) under 
the sponsorship of the NASA Johnson Space Center 
(JSC). DARE is being used to: 
• Assess the risks of each of the abort scenarios 
and identify their major risk contributors 
• Identify the abort scenarios with the least risk in 
the event that one of three Space Shuttle Main 
Engines (SSME) benignly shuts down during as-
cent 
• Perform various design and operational trade 
studies 
4 SPACE SHUTTLE INTACT ABORT OPTIONS 
As the Space Shuttle ascends to orbit, it transverses 
various intact abort regions planned before the flight 
to ensure that the Space Shuttle Orbiter, along with 
its crew, may be returned to either one of the follow-
ing: the original launch site (RTLS), a transatlantic 
landing site (TAL), or from a substandard orbit 
(ATO) in the event that an abort is initiated. Each of 
these options is shown in Figure 1. If a failure 
should occur late in the trajectory, mission control 
may opt to simply continue on to the planned orbit 
(press to MECO - PTM). If a significant failure 
during an intact abort occurs, then a contingency 
abort is executed. 
-- ---_ .. - ------
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Figure 1. Space Shuttle Intact Abort Options 
As the Space Shuttle climbs to orbit, the conse-
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severe. More specifically, as the vehicle gains mo-
mentum and altitude it is better situated to maneuver 
and conduct aborts, The most challencin a of the 
aborts available to a Shuttle pilot are the ~eturn to 
the launch site (RTLS) or a trans-atlantic abort land-
ing (TAL). Both of these abort modes require the 
Shut~l~ to have, a minimum altitude and velocity 
provIding sufficIent energy (kinetic and potential) to 
enable the spectrum of vehicle state vectors, This 
spectrum is necessary to allow for the successful 
completion of either of these difficult landing ap-
proaches. These minimum energy profiles require 
that the remaining two engines continue firing for 
the length of time necessary to ensure that the proper 
profile is attained to attempt an abort. 
5 DARE MODELING CONCEPT 
The DARE modeling concept is shown in Figure 2, 
It begins with an initiating event, and terminates 
with an en~ state. This methodology was designed 
to ,~~dle tlme-d~pendent conditional failure prob-
abIlItIes for the pIvotal events, and conditional fail-
ure probabilities based on pivotal events interde-
pendencies (i.e, failure of the Orbital Maneuvering 
SystemJReaction Control System (OMSIRCS) to 
dump propellant would affect the weight of the Or-
biter at landing and thereby increase the Loss Of 
Vehicle (LOV) risk), For the DARE model, pivotal 
events represent failures of systems or conditions 
th~t ~ight result in a failure to successfully abort a 
mISSIOn, 
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Figure 2. DARE Modeling Concept 
6 DYNAMIC MODEL DEVELOPME T 
Figure 3, shown below, represents the outline for the 
DARE model development process , The DARE 
modeling approach involves a disciplined time de-
pendent analysis of scenarios, 
Quantify dynamic event 
trees 10 assess probability 
of abort options 
DARE ExceWisual Basic 
Figure 3. DARE Methodology Process 
The process begins with the Dynamic Event Dia-
gram (DED) ~d ends with producing the report of 
results. A bnef description of the steps that were 
taken to develop DARE are outlined in the following 
subsections, 
6.1 Dynamic Event Diagrams (DED) 
~ a conventional PRA practice, an event sequence 
dIagram (ESD) is developed to represent the suc-
cesses/failures of the systems required for a success-
ful abort, Reaching beyond the limits of the ESD 
the DED was developed to show the time at which 
these systems are required to initiate and function, 
DEDs, developed for each abort scenario (RTLS, 
TAL. and ATO), represent the systems that must 
functIOn to accomplish a successful abort, These 
systems can be considered pivotal events as defined 
~bove: Simply, the DED is used as a map to further 
Investlgate the initiating events, the abort region, and 
the systems to be modeled and analyzed. Figure 4, 
shown below, represents a non abort-specific DED. 
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Figure 4. Dynamic Event Diagram (DED) Example 
6.2 Identification of Abort Initiators 
An intact abort may be initiated due to a number of 
system failures, but the most likely abort scenarios 
are initiated by a premature benign shutdown of one 
of three 55MB (Maggio G. et al. 2000). Therefore, 
this was the abort-initiating event that was chosen 
for further in-depth dynamic probabilistic risk as-
sessment. 
6.3 Determine Abort Region 
As shown in Figure 5, different intact abort options 
are available and chosen depending on the time a 
benign engine shutdown occurs. The dynamic prob-
abilistic risk model for intact aborts uses abort re-
gion estimates from flight dynamicists that include 
the time of a benign engine shutdown and its associ-
ated available abort options. The actual abort 
boundaries are calculated prior to each flight based 
on a number of complex mission time-dependent pa-
rameters such as vehicle weight, orbital inclination, 
and available landing sites, etc. 
There are cases where these abort regions might 
overlap. Ifthis occurs (where performance loss is the 
only factor), the next available abort option would 
be chosen (i.e. if both are available, a TAL is always 
chosen over an RTLS) when the initiating event is a 
benign engine shutdown. 
o 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mission Elapsed Time (MET) in minutes 
Figure 5. Typical Abort Boundaries used in DARE 
Exercising anyone of the abort options will de-
pend upon the time at which the first engine be-
nignly shuts down. For example, an RTLS due to an 
engine out at lift-off is selected at the earliest time, 
approximately two minutes, twenty seconds into the 
mission (after solid rocket booster separation). The 
probability of a benign shutdown of the second en-
gine or the probability of a catastrophic failure of ei-
ther one of the remaining two engines will vary de-
pending on when the first engine shutdown occurred. 
The STS 101 and STS 111 are the missions that 
are currently being evaluated by the DARE model. 
The baseline DARE model uses 104.5% as its throt-
tle level of the Block IT 55MBs. However, the 
model has the capability to evaluate the risk of ele-
vated power levels as well as evaluating the LOV 
risk for various other planned missions. 
6.4 Identification of Systems NecessalY for a 
Successful Abort 
The following is a list of the modules that make up 
the DARE model, These modules represent the sys-
tems that must function during an abort in order to 
accomplish a safe landing. 
SSME: As the Space Shuttle ascends to orbit, the 
severity of the consequences of a single engine 
shutdown changes with time. The DARE model 
evaluates the LOV risk due to a second 55MB 
shutdown and the LOV risk due to catastrophic 
failure of one of the remaining two SSMEs. 
External Tank (ET) Separation: When the SSMEs 
are shutdown, the ET is jettisoned and it breaks up 
as it enters the Earth's atmosphere. Successful 
ET separation depends on the success of the Reac-
tion Control System (RCS) to perform its intended 
function. 
ET Debris Hit: During a TAL abort, subsequent to 
OrbiterlET separation, the ET may be in relatively 
close range of the Orbiter when it ruptures during 
entry. This increases the risk of the Orbiter being 
struck by ET debris. 
Powered Pitch Around (PPA) : The PPA maneuver 
is performed only during an R TLS abort. The 
PP A maneuver changes the Orbiter' s attitude from 
heads-down going away from the launch site to 
heads-up pointing toward the launch site by an 
approximately 60 to 70 degree maneuver Failure 
to perform this maneuver within a specific period 
oftime would lead to landing short of the runway 
or missing it completely which was assumed to re-
sult in LOY. 
Powered Pitch Down (PPD): This is an RTLS 
specific critical maneuver. During the powered 
portion of an RTLS abort, in order for altitude and 
flight path angle constraints to be met at Main En-
gine Cut Off (MECO), a positive angle of attack 
(~30 degrees) is required. However, an angle of 
attack of -2 degrees is necessary to ensure a safe 
ET separation. This transition is what is referred 
to as powered pitch down and must be completed 
rapidly by properly gimbaling the engine thrust to 
avoid large sink rates, which may cause overheat-
ing and overstressing. Failure to perform the PPD 
maneuver was quantified by modeling the inabil-
ity to gimbal one of the remaining two SSME. 
Control Surfaces: Control surface failures were 
assumed the driving risk factor in maintaining 
control of the vehicle during the glide phase of 
RTLS and TAL intact aborts. A streamlined 
model based on aircraft parts reliability was de-
veloped to account for this risk. 
ThY'rmnl Prntprtinn Sy:tPfYI· Th f'. f~ilmA moriAfI of 
the TPS during a TAL abort are assumed similar 
to those that might occur during a nominal mis-
sion. These failure modes include: debris damage 
with subsequent tile debonding (external tank, 
right solid rocket booster nosecone or orbital de-
bris) and debonding from other sources (heating 
loads, high temperatures, aero-acoustic loads, cy-
cle degradation of bonding materials and mainte-
nance errors). 
Touchdown Associated Failures: This includes 
the risk due to: excessive sink rate, tire failure(s) 
or runway under/overshoot, misalignment. 
Orbital Maneuvering System/Reaction Control 
System (OMS/RCS) Dumps: Similar to the MPS, 
the OMSIRCS is modeled in DARE for its ability 
to dump propellant to reduce the likelihood of 
LOV. The amount of OMS propellant onboard 
the Shuttle during launch is mission specific. 
During an abort, the OMS propellant is dumped 
by burning it through both OMEs and possibly 
through the twenty-four aft RCS thrusters . This 
improves the performance during the abort and 
enables the Orbiter to achieve an acceptable land-
ing weight and center of gravity (e.G.) location. 
Main Propulsion System Dump: The MPS is 
modeled in DARE for its ability to dump propel-
lant to reduce the likelihood of LOY. If the lV1PS 
fails to durnp enough propellant, it would result in 
violating the Orbiter C.G. envelope, which in tum, 
could lead to loss of control ofthe vehicle. 
6.5 System Interdependencies 
Tremendous amounts of interdependencies exist 
among the modules listed above. For example, fail-
ure of the OMSIRCS to dump propellant during an 
abort would increase the risk at touchdown because 
an excessively heavy Orbiter will have too high a 
sink rate, possibly causing the Orbiter to slap down 
onto the runway. Furthermore, a high sink rate is 
likely to cause collapse of the landing gear and/or 
tire blowout. 
6.6 Develop and Evaluate Models f or Abort 
Systems 
The DARE modeling process included the develop-
ment of risk models for each of the systems dis-
cussed above. Some of these risk models used con-
ventional risk methodology that include fault tree 
and event tree type models. For example, the PPD 
was modeled and quantified using fault tree analysis 
and was later incorporated into the DARE model. 
Th e: OMS/Rr:S llfle~ an event tree to both display 
and quantify the different failure scenarios of the 
OME and RCS jets. Some of these sequences re-
sulted in end states that violate the Orbiter' s C.G. 
limits affecting flight stability and were assumed to 
result in LOV. Other systems, such as the SSME 
time dependent risks are modeled using dynamic 
event trees and quantified using MS Excel and Vis-
ual Basic programming. 
6. 7 Data Analyses 
Statistical distributions representing the pivotal 
event failures were constructed and used as input 
into the DARE model to quantify the abort risks . 
For example, lognormal distributions for both the 
likelihood of the orbiter getting hit by debris due to 
the breakup of the external tank in the Earth' s at-
mosphere and the mean time-between-failure for the 
benign shutdown and catastrophic failure probabili-
ties for the SSMEs were developed and used to 
evaluate the LOV risk. The Weibull distribution was 
used to evaluate the time dependent SSME risks . 
6.8 Quantification 
The DARE model has a graphical user interface 
(GUI) which employs complex MS Excel and Visual 
Basic macros to perform a Monte Carlo simulation 
to evaluate the abort risks. 
The DARE model uses a set of inputs provided 
by NASA flight dynamicists. These parameters are 
mission specific and include the following items: 
• Abort Landing Site 
• Inclination (deg) 
• First Engine Shutdown Time (sec) 
• Solid Rocket Booster Staging (sec) 
• OMS Assist On and Off (sec) 
• Abort Initiation Time (sec) 
• RCS Ignition Time (sec) 
• OMSIRCS Dump Stop (sec) 
• OMS Dump Duration Time (sec) 
• RTLS Turnaround Time (sec) 
• Powered Pitch Down Time (sec) 
• Main Engine Cutoff Time (sec) 
• External Tank Separation Time (sec) 
• Orbiter center of gravity at lift off (x and y (in)) 
• Second stage lift off weight (lbs) 
• Orbiter lift off weight (lbs) 
The results for each specific trajectory are gener-
ated and output within the MS Excel environment. 
The DARE model evaluates the LOV risks due to 
failure of any of the systems described above 
During the quantification process, DARE selects 
conditional failure probabilities for the systems 
components based on: 1) time of the first engine 
shlltrlown; (Inri 2) other systems failures durin~ a 
specific abort scenario. For example, failure of the 
OMSIRCS to dump propellant during an abort in-
creases the LOV risk at touchdown due to an exces-
sively heavy Orbiter. The DARE model assigns 
touchdown failure probabilities depending on 
whether the OMSIRCS is successful in dumping 
propellant. 
Another example of how the DARE model evalu-
ates the dynamic risk is illustrated below in Figure 6. 
This figure represents a conceptual diagram for the 
evaluation of the LOV risk due to a catastrophic 
failure of either one of the two remaining SSMEs. 
(.) 
:c (I) 
c. .. 
f!:: 
... Prbb. of 2nd . ~ ~ " ;s~ u e catastrophic 
G) Q.. FES = engine failure at 
.~ ~ . . ... ' .. ,00 seC; , 104.5% power level .. 
" :J 3= E~ 
:J 
U 
100 200 300 400 
610'II e 
Continuous Burn Time (sec) 
600 700 800 
Figure 6. Estimation of Catastrophic Failure (conceptual) 
Given a first engine shuts down at 100 seconds, 
the probability of a second engine catastrophically 
failing is given by the dotted line (with 'stars'). This 
is a function of the continuous burn time and the 
lognormal distribution as it marches through the 
time segments along the Weibull curve. This repre-
sents the SSME failure probability given that the 
power level is at 104% following the first engine 
shutdown. 
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7 APPLICATIONS OF THE DARE MODEL 
The primary application of the DARE model is to 
evaluate the Loss of Vehicle (LOV) risk due to an 
abort given a benign engine shutdown. The DARE 
model has been used to perform sensitivity analyses 
and trade studies that include: 
• Evaluating the abort risk of the SSME Block II 
vs. Block IIA 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Assessing the risk of being in a black zone given 
a second engine shutdown 
Assessing the probability of crew bailout given a 
second engine shutdown 
Assessing the probability of having to perform 
an East Coast Abort Landing (ECAL) given a 
second engine shutdown 
Evalu.ating the abort risk given higher SSME 
throttle levels 
The DARE model is being used, and will continue to 
be used in the decision-making process to assess and 
improve the Space Shuttle operation, maintenance, 
and emergency procedures for the nominal a..'1d the 
abort scenarios. 
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Assessment of Space Shuttle Abort Risk for 
Varying In-flight Vehicle Management Scenarios 
Modification to Statement of Work (121202) 
I. Introduction 
A study was undertaken by SAIC under Purchase Order T-6398W to quantify the 
risks associated with the Return-To-Launch-Site (RTLS) and Transoceanic-Abort-
Landing (TAL) intact abort scenarios. SAIC developed The Space Shuttle Dynamic 
Abort Risk Evaluator (DARE) . DARE is a computer code that uses the dynamic 
stochastic risk assessment methodology to assess the intact abort risk encountered during 
Space Shuttle missions. DARE is being utilized to assess the following phases of this 
project: 
Phase I: Develop and implement a DARE model for RTLS and TAL intact aborts 
Phase II: Develop and implement a DARE model for ATO 
Phase III: Develop and implement a DARE model for contingency aborts (2EO) 
Phase IV: Incorporate the Shuttle PRA results into DARE 
Phase V: Independent DARE Assessment 
Phase I has been further subdivided into three phases, Phases IA, IB, IC and rD. In 
Phase IA, modifications to the DARE were made to facilitate the unique requirements of 
this assessment and to streamline the evaluation of any future in-flight scenarios. 
Specifically, the DARE model was modified to output risk estimates for point abort 
boundary conditions rather than statistically generated data. The results for RTLS and 
TAL intact aborts were differentiated to facilitate comparative assessment of the risk 
associated with each option. Phase IE included the development of additional DARE 
modules as well as modifications to existing modules to address areas identified during 
Phase IA. Under Phase IC, updated the SSME risk probabilities and compared the risks 
between BKII and BKIIA SSME engines and provided support to the JSC Technical 
Panel Reviews 
The specific tasks completed in both ofthe previous sub-phases are as follows : 
>- Phase IA 
o Modify DARE to Analyze Point Input Conditions 
o Differentiation of R TLS and TAL Risk Results 
o Produce Results for Defined RTLS and TAL cases 
>- Phase IB 
o Review NASA RTLS and TAL Risk Concerns 
o ET Separation Risk Model Review 
o Meeting with SSME Reliability Experts 
o Expand DARE to Include R TLS and TAL Glide Phases 
o Produce Interim Results for Modified RTLS and TAL DARE Model 
o ET Debris Impact Risk Model Review 
o Two-Engine Shutdown LOV/LOC Assessment 
o Produce Final Results for Modified R TLS and TAL DARE Model 
,-- -
I 
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> Phase IC 
o Update SSME Risk Probability 
o SSME Block II and Block IIA Risk Comparisons 
o Comparisons ofRTLS and TAL Risk for Varying Power Levels 
o Comparisons ofRTLS Risk with varying Q-bar at ET Separation 
o Prepared and delivered presentation to Flight Technique Panel 
o Prepared and delivered presentation to Integration Control Board 
o Prepared and delivered presentation to Space Shuttle Risk Assessment 
Team 
Phase II 
o Developed and integrated risk modules for A TO 
o Produced Results for defined ATO 
Phase IV task IV-1 
o Incorporate SPRAT Preliminary models/results into the DARE model 
o Obtain Abort Trajectories from JSC and perform sensitivity analyses 
to evaluate the LOCV for a number of Abort scenarios for different 
engine shutdown times and related abort types. 
o Aggregate DARE results with SSME shutdown estimates to provide a 
single abort risk input for SPRAT 
o Prepare presentation and report findings 
Phase V 
o Prepare a document describing the DARE model mechanics and 
probabilistic methodology and its application 
This modification is proposed to amend the existing statement of work with Phase VI. 
Phase VI will provide support to the Independent Peer Review team. 
The phases of this contract are described in detail below: 
The tasks in each ofthese subsequent pre-approved phases are as follows: 
> Phase ID 
o R TLS Risk Reduction Investigation 
> Phase III 
o Develop and Integrate Risk Model for Contingency Aborts 
o Produce Results for Defined Contingency Case 
Phase IV 
o Review SPRAT Preliminary and Final Models and results 
o Update DARE with SPRAT Results 
o Prepare presentation and report findings 
2 
Note that only Phase VI is discussed in the subsequent sections since Phase ID, Phase 
III and Phase IV are part of the existing purchase order. 
II. Task Descriptions 
A. Phase VI - Independent Assessment Review and Independent Peer Review Support 
The following tasks are required to support the Independent Review Team: 
o Arrange meeting with IPR team and provide written information 
o Prepare presentation on DARE technology 
o Present DARE technology to NASA -JSC, NASA risks analysis management and the 
Independent Reviewers. 
o Provide IPR team with any additional information 
o Solicit and review IPR comments. 
o Prepare response to IPR comments and submit to IPR for approval. 
o Resolve any IPR comments or disagreements that might result from item described 
above 
o Develop a plan to implement IPR recommendations and make modifications if 
funding allows 
III. Deliverables 
The following describes the deliverables required by this SOW. 
Report of Results 
SAIC shall deliver a report (in the form of a presentation) on the results at the end of each 
phase of the DARE project. For each phase, the report will describe the data, 
assumptions, and analysis methods used to produce the results. The report shall be 
delivered to NASA in an electronic form. Each report shall be delivered no later than 1 
month after completion of the technical requirements. 
IV. Period of Performance 
The funded period of performance will not change and remains September 1, 2000 to 
December 31, 2003. 
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v. Cost 
These are rough-order of magnitude (ROM) estimates and are not official estimates: 
Phase VI 
Description 
Independent Peer Review Support 
Official estimates shall be provided in the final proposal. 
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Cost 
$30,891 
